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A B S T R A C T
Acquisitions are often used as a way to engage in corporate venturing. The value of these ventures tends
to reside in the knowledge and capabilities of the key management team members who have and
maintain key inter-organizational relationships. Because their knowledge and/or relationships may be
tacit and therefore difﬁcult to transfer, retaining the key managers in the acquired organization is often a
critical issue for the human resource management of the acquiring organization. They are also frequently
thought to be critical elements in the future performance in global supply chains and therefore, should
be a key concern of human resource management after the acquisition has been culminated. Using a
unique dataset of corporate acquisitions in supply-chains, we examine how the development of the
psychological contract elements affects retention of critical key global managers. We ﬁnd that higher
retention of the key management team members leads to higher performance after acquisition. We also
ﬁnd that the development of the psychological contract has a positive impact on the retention of key
managers with global supply-chain relations.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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In 2007, merger and acquisition (M&A) deals worth $4.367
trillion were announced, up from $3.4 trillion in 2006 to $2.9
trillion in 2005 (Moshieri & Campa, 2009; Wall Street Journal,
2006). The total value of global M&A fell by $1.1 trillion due to the
global economic crisis for 2008, with volume dropping from 15,256
deals throughout 2007 to 12,018 deals in 2008 (Hodges, 2009).
Within a broader corporate context, the motivation for acquisi-
tions can vary. For example, in the 1980s, much of the M&A activity
was focused on hostile takeovers as a means to restructure poorly
performing conglomerates (Montgomery, 1994). But, in November
2009 M&A buyout activity rebounded to $323 billon the highest
month since July 2008 (Kalwarski, 2010).
From an agency perspective, this acquisition activity in the 1990s
was motivated through the market for corporate control with an
ultimate goal of restructuring these ﬁrms for efﬁciency and discipline
over management through the reduction of free cash ﬂows (Jensen,
1986). More recently as global competition is now the norm,* Corresponding author at: Department of Management, University of Mississippi,
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doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2010.10.023acquisition activity has been seen as a means by which an
organization can extend its competencies incrementally (Chang,
1996). This view of M&A activity is consistent with the resource
based perspective (Barney, 1986, 1991) wherein an organization
seeks to increase their capabilities relative to skills as well as increase
their scope of operations through strategic acquisitions. Because a
ﬁrm typically possesses unused capacity, diversiﬁcation to extend
the use of the ﬁrm’s resources and frequently capabilities generates
net beneﬁts (Penrose, 1959; Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001).
Additionally, acquisitions from this perspective provide the oppor-
tunity to develop new capabilities both within the acquired unit and
within the corporate parent particularly when the acquisition is in a
global supply chain (Markides & Williamson, 1994).
It is apparent that the merger and acquisition strategy
continues to be popular for competing in the fast paced global
marketplace of the 21st century. This is typically true in global
acquisitions that are centered on global supply-chains. The Council
of Supply Chain Management Professionals state that global supply
chain encompasses the planning and management of all activities
involved in sourcing, procurement, conversion and logistics
management. The operational expectations of global supply chain
management include the crucial components of coordination and
collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers,
intermediaries and third-party service providers, as well as
consumers (Hult, Tomas, Hurley, & Knight, 2004).
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integrates supply and demand management within and across
companies (Flint, 2004; Handﬁeld & Nichols, 2004; Vickery,
Calatone, & Droge, 2006). Recently, the acquisition of global
supply chains has been seen as a way for ﬁrms to engage in
obtaining and leveraging new resources through corporate
venturing (Thomson & McNamara, 2001). In particular, acquisi-
tions may form a critical component of external corporate
venturing (Miles & Covin, 2002). Within this stream of research,
acquisitions serve many purposes including: as a means to
overcome learning distance between supply-chain members
(Busenitz, Hoskisson, Arthurs, & Hansen, 2006), supply-chain
members to learn about new markets and channel members
(Handﬁeld & Nichols, 2004; Hult et al., 2004), and as a way to
engage in corporate renewal when that renewal involves learning
from supply-chain partners (Dess et al., 2003; Palmatier, Dant,
Grewal, & Evans, 2006). Acquisitions may also be a means by which
a larger supply-chain member can place an option on a smaller
ﬁrm pursuing new technology (McGrath, 2001). Indeed, larger
ﬁrms often engage in acquisitions in order to ensure that they are
able to appropriate the rents from new resources and new
technology (Pisano, 1990). The key issue in examining acquisitions
of global supply chain members is that some of the values are the
interorganizational relationships that have been created by the key
management team (KMT) of the acquired organization (Flint,
2004; Handﬁeld & Nichols, 2004; Stank, Keller, & Closs, 2001).
Relationship marketing has created a high level of interest in
interorganizational relationships with 400 articles being published
on the topic since 1990 in the marketing literature (Palmatier et
al., 2006)
Examining acquisitions from this perspective has signiﬁcant
implications on the response of the acquiring ﬁrm vis-a`-vis the
acquired ﬁrm. Although earlier research has identiﬁed the
acquisition process as critical to the overall success of the
acquisition (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), we submit that this becomes
even more critical in the context of acquisitions as a means of
corporate venturing. In particular, we argue that the ability of the
acquiring ﬁrm to maintain the active support of the key talent in
the acquired ﬁrm is critical to the success of the corporate
venturing. Because human assets cannot be owned like a piece of
equipment or a technology license (Coff, 1997, 1999), the human
capital of an organization is not bound to the company after the
acquisition. They (the acquired ﬁrm’s human assets) may decide to
leave after the acquisition especially if they perceive that the
acquiring ﬁrm is mistreating or else neglecting its responsibilities
towards them. This perceived neglect often grows out of a violation
of the psychological contract between the employing organization
and the employees (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1989).
The psychological contract represents the employees’ beliefs
about the reciprocal rights and obligations between them and the
acquiring organization. After the acquisition, employees may feel
that these obligations have been repudiated. In the end, if an
organization acquiring a ﬁrm as part of its corporate venturing
activity fails to embrace the new employees and to reestablish the
psychological contract, defection may occur. This is of particular
interest in acquisitions where relationships are central to the value
of the management team (e.g., marketing relationships in supply-
chains) (Harvey & Richey, 2001; Joshi, 1993).
Because important knowledge is often embedded in the human
assets of an organization (Lepak & Snell, 1999), the ability to learn
through acquisitions within a corporate venturing context would
tend to magnify the importance of the human assets in the
acquired supply-chain organizations. With this in mind, we seek to
identify ﬁrst whether the retention of the key management team
(KMT) in acquired ﬁrms as part of corporate venturing activity is
associated with stronger post-acquisition performance in thoseunits. Second, we seek to identify whether the development of
psychological contract elements leads to greater retention of the
key management team. Lastly, we seek to examine how the
external environment affects the implementation of the psycho-
logical contract elements. Greater dynamism (e.g., interorganiza-
tional relationships) within a corporate venturing context, requires
a need for greater human resource attention to the entire
acquisition process (De Wulf, Odekerken-Schroder, & Iacobucci,
2001; Wright et al., 2001).
Our theoretical contribution is focused on extending resource
based theory by identifying how organizations engaging in
corporate venturing through supply-chain acquisitions preserve
the embedded value (e.g., critical human capital) of the acquisition.
We begin to address issues concerning the coping mechanisms
used by organizations to retain greater value when that value is
derived from human assets (cf. Coff, 1997; Wright et al., 2001). If
the psychological contract can be used as a device to retain critical
inter-organizational talent and limit post-acquisition turnover, our
results will have practical signiﬁcance as well (Gruen, Summers, &
Acito, 2000).
This paper follows the logic of: ﬁrst, target ﬁrm’s key
management team (KMT) retention and the subsequent effect of
post-acquisition performance from a resource based view are
explored. Second, contract theory and the development of
psychological contracts and how they evolve between the target
ﬁrm’s KMT and the acquirer are examined. Third, hypotheses are
developed to explain post acquisition performance, which is
centered on the effects of KMT retention and psychological
contract development on post acquisition performance. Fourth,
the hypotheses in the sample of acquisitions are tested. Fifth, the
results of the study are discussed.
2. Key management team (KMT) ongoing value
The resource based view of the ﬁrm suggests that organizations
accumulate and develop a bundle of specialized resources that are
both tangible vs. intangible and internal vs. external to the ﬁrm.
These resources, when applied appropriately, should generate
above average returns and can create a sustainable competitive
advantage (Barney, 1986, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984).
When it is impossible to develop such human resources organically
(internally), ﬁrms often will attempt to obtain these relational
resources through acquisition (externally).
The focus of research in the resource based view is probably
best restricted to those differences between organizations that
competitors cannot (or do not) duplicate for whatever reasons, or
that competitors cannot duplicate loosely enough to eliminate the
advantage (Hunt & Morgan, 1994; Palmatier et al., 2006). Due to
inimitability and the dependent variable as competitive advantage,
competitor’s inability to duplicate successful (rare, non-substitut-
able, inimitable, and valuable) strategies will create a sustainable
competitive advantage. Examples of these resources/assets are:
key management team, brand names, in-house knowledge of
technology, employment of skilled personnel, trade contacts,
machinery, efﬁcient procedures, and capital.
The resource based view offers that physical, human, and
organizational resources are an organization’s source of competi-
tive advantage when they are valuable, rare, non-substitutable and
inimitable (Barney, 1991). These resources can be modiﬁed as an
organization’s knowledge of markets, technologies, and consumer
needs and attitudes are affected by external inputs (Penrose, 1959).
The KMT has control over all organizational resources, human
resources and physical assets to one degree or another (Goetz &
Scott, 1981). As new knowledge is developed or obtained, the KMT
reacts to modify strategy. The KMT plus their expert knowledge
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) can be seen as a valuable, rare, non-
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based resources, such as the KMT and their experience, assist in the
development of the organization’s strategy, core competencies,
and subsequently its value (Iacobucci & Ostrom, 1996; Miller &
Shamsie, 1996).
Human resources are particularly valuable to any organization
in developing a competitive advantage through relationship
management in supply-chains (Lepak & Snell, 1998). Human
capital is one of the most important resources in a ﬁrm and top
management team experience is one of the most sought after
criteria when purchasing supply-chain members (Zacharakis &
Meyer, 2000). The resource based perspective has important
implications for the importance of KMT, especially when ‘‘the
productivity of superior resources depends upon the nature of
their employment and the skill with which a strategy based on
resource superiority is implemented’’ (Peteraf, 1993: p. 186). One
of the implicit forms of resources is the relationship that is built
between organizations to form the global supply chain. Personal
relationships form the bedrock of relational marketing and are
instrumental in the functioning of the global supply chain as well
as critical in the on-going maintenance of the ﬂow of goods and
services in global supply chains (Lusch & Brown, 1996).
Relationship marketing in global supply chains can be deﬁned
as networks or interactions between partners with the goal of a
win/win outcome increasing relationship duration (Gummesson,
1996). In relationship marketing, asymmetrical relationships can
exist but the dis-equilibrium moves the organization towards
monopoly or dissolution (Gummesson, 1996). Typical constructs
include: inﬂuence (supplier/buyer), cooperation, satisfaction,
dependence, trust, reliability, honesty, benevolence, commitment,
justice, culture and diligence (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Doney,
Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; Ganesan,
1994; Gummesson, 1996). Ultimately the contribution of the
relationship marketing to the effective operation of global supply
chains is that of understanding and collaboration between ﬁrms in
the global supply chain (Gummesson, 1996; Iacobucci & Ostrom,
1996). Such collaboration is governed by trust and contracting in
global supply chain management.
Relationship development in global supply chain management
ﬂows through the stages of: (1) awareness; (2) exploration; (3)
attraction; (4) communication/bargaining; (5) development of
power; (6) development of norms; (7) development of expecta-
tions, expansion, commitment (level of inputs, durability/longevi-
ty and consistency/frequency) and; (8) dissolution (Dwyer et al.,
1987). From these stages, working partnerships are deﬁned.
Research shows that in these partnerships, cooperation breeds
trust that breeds more cooperation (Anderson & Narus, 1996;
Srinivasan & Moorman, 2005). The Anderson and Narus model
proposes that communication affects relative dependence, out-
comes, and trust; trust is also affected by cooperation; inﬂuence
and trust affect conﬂict; trust and conﬂict affect outcomes
(Anderson & Narus, 1996). According to this framework, there is
little doubt pertaining to the importance of trust in relationship
development and continuance (Gruen et al., 2000; Hennig-Thurau,
Gwinner, & Gremler, 2002). The question that is pertaining to
relational marketing operations is do these relationships transfer?
(Hibbard, Brunel, Dant, & Icobucci, 2001)
A signiﬁcant amount of new ventures in global supply chains is
started by teams of individuals working in an interorganizational
manner among the members of the global supply chain (Chandler,
Honig, & Wiklund, 2005). As these ventures mature, changes in the
requirements for capabilities and competencies also evolve into
organizational as well as personal relationships (Iacobucci &
Ostrom, 1996). Therefore, any key manager departures are more
likely to have an impact on the performance of the global supply
chain’s performance (James & Soref, 1981). For example, thestabilization of roles becomes formalized in venture growth and
departures provide a functional anchor that helps to bind the
relationship together after an acquisition (Chandler et al., 2005).
Supply chain management research suggests that collaboration
instead of competition is emphasized (Vainio, 2005) and value
creation is envisioned as the chief goal of multiple ﬁrms (Lee &
Cavusgil, 2006) developed over time by individuals. In supply
chain value networks, ﬁrms that manage to integrate their actions
through collaboration are often able to deliver signiﬁcantly
improved performance (Barratt, 2004; Stank, Keller, & Daugherty
2001), and beneﬁt yet further from closer relationships that foster
dynamic opportunities for superior network performance (Blan-
kenburg-Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 1999). Although much of this
research is based upon the unit analysis of ﬁrm level, and now
researchers are focusing on the entire length of the supply chain as
the unit of analysis, all the research acknowledges the importance
of the individual to develop the trust and relationships necessary.
Managerial deﬁnitions of supply chain partnerships or value
networks are very vague, such as ‘‘meeting of minds’’ (Ellram &
Hendrick, 1995), or focusing on the motives (Landeros, Reck, &
Plank 1995) and outcomes of the relationship rather than
identifying speciﬁc attributes. Dependency between parties
(Brennan, 1997) such as, information sharing, coordination of
resource sharing (Whipple, Frankel, & Daugherty, 2001), long-term
orientation (Ganesan, 1996), as well as risks and rewards of the
relationship (Ellram & Hendrick, 1995) has been identiﬁed by
scholars as key forms of dependence. Per social network theory,
these relationships may not transfer if one of the individuals were
to leave the ﬁrm after the acquisition.
One of the relational beneﬁts inherent to supply chains is
improvement in organizational social capital developed by
individuals over the chain duration (Lanier, Wempe, & Zacharia,
2010). Relational exchange norms and values such as role integrity,
mutuality, solidarity, ﬂexibility, bilateral information exchange,
harmonious conﬂict resolution and long term orientation are
shared between the partners, both individually and as a ﬁrm
(Brown, Dev, & Lee 2000). These norms contribute to the existing
social capital of partners and have an impact on the ﬁrm level
organizational social capital. Since social capital facilitates
resource exchanges between partners (Adler & Kwon, 2002;
Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998) competitive advantage is now derived
not between ﬁrms but from competition in supply chains (Harland,
Caldwell, Power, & Zheng, 2007). When individuals leave the ﬁrm
where they have been the cornerstone of the relationship between
two ﬁrms, the relationship may also become severed.
The KMT through their direction, strategy formulation, and
management manipulates and develops the synergies among the
organization’s resources. For example, intangible assets comple-
ment tangible assets such as plant and equipment or market based
assets such as customer/brand and channel relationships (Srivas-
tava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998). However, organization resources
are inﬂuenced by a variety of actions taken by management both in
the rate of growth of the organization and in the direction of
growth. Inimitability in human resource competencies is devel-
oped through unique historical paths maintaining often hidden
interdependencies, particularly when inter-organizational rela-
tions are at the center of the value of the asset (Becker & Huselid,
1998).
The complexity of the internal and external environment makes
the KMT’s strategic decision-making difﬁcult and is inﬂuenced by
their idiosyncratic situational contexts. Amit and Schoemaker
(1993: p. 44) argue, ‘‘owing to uncertainty, complexity, and conﬂict
(both in and outside the organization), different organizations will
employ different strategic assets, without any one set being
probably optimal or easily imitated’’. In essence, how the KMT
employs the assets, affects the success of a strategy. As the KMT
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successful the strategy the more sustainable will be a competitive
advantage (Barney, 1986, 1991; Godfrey & Hill, 1995).
In summary, the resource based view suggests that bundles of
combinations of tangible and intangible resources within the
organization can be a competitive advantage for organizations. As
KMT controls the strategic disposition of these assets, and the
accumulation and development of both the intangible and tangible
assets, the KMT of a successful target ﬁrm could very well be the
lynch-pin for continued competitive advantage.
H1. There is a positive relationship between human capital in the
form of KMT retention and post-acquisition performance of the
acquired supply-chain ﬁrm.
2.1. Psychological contract with KMT members
It is argued that the KMT is central in the retention of the
value of an acquisition in the supply chain when that acquisition
is undertaken for corporate venturing purposes. The KMT
maintains speciﬁc knowledge concerning the organization and
its relationships in the inter-organizational environment and this
knowledge is often tacit and therefore, not easily transferred to
others. Additionally the resources and capabilities of the
organization being acquired are often tied to the KMT (cf.
Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). As a result, we argue that the ability to
appropriate value from the acquisition is contingent on the
retention of the KMT and this will likely be a key goal when
acquisition is part of an organization’s corporate venturing
activities in supply-chains.
To understand the dynamics of KMT retention in an acquisition,
it is essential to understand the formal and informal linkages of the
target ﬁrm’s KMT. The KMT has developed a formal relationship
within its ﬁrm (concerning things such as salary and beneﬁts) and
informal inter-organizational relationships developed over time
with supply-chain members and other external constituents. This
informal relationship internally is manifested as a psychological
contract and embodies such things as mutual expectations and
core values. The target ﬁrm’s KMT is bound to the ﬁrm through
these formal and informal relationships. If the acquiring ﬁrm
wishes to retain the KMT, we believe that the psychological
contract must be developed or transferred.
In deﬁning employment relationships, psychological contracts
have become more important in understanding the retention and
motivation of key employees (Turnley, Bolino, Lester, & Bloodgood,
2004). Mutual obligations between the ﬁrm and the KMT which
have developed over time are entwined in psychological contracts
that go beyond written employment contracts or explicit job
duties. Literature has suggested that when the psychological
contract has been breached by the ﬁrm, that the employees’
attitudes and behaviors change for the worse and as a result
produce negative outcomes, such as quitting (Goetz & Scott, 1981).
During an acquisition new goals and norms will be established,
effectively transforming employees’ roles and obligations affecting
the prior psychological contract between the KMT and the ﬁrm. As
such, either a new psychological contract needs to be developed or
the previous one transferred to retain the KMT.
To understand perceived employment obligations, one needs to
consider the social phenomena in which they are entwined and the
acquisition context brings great uncertainty (Anderson & Narus,
1996). As psychological contracts are deﬁned as a person’s mutual
obligations in an employment exchange relationship, the acquiring
ﬁrm must quickly identify the KMT and discuss/develop these
mutual long-term goals that are not restricted to purely economic
terms but to also loyalty in exchange for security and growth
within the new organization (Raja, Johns, & Ntalianis, 2004). This isof particular importance when dealing with managers with key
external inter-organizational relationships (i.e., key accounts or
key channel relationships).
Accordingly, it can be argued that the acquiring ﬁrm’s actions in
regard to the psychological contract development with the target
ﬁrm’s KMT will directly affect retention of the KMT (Joshi, 1993).
As the KMT has the power to leave the ﬁrm, and is valuable enough
to have the opportunities to do so, the acquiring ﬁrm will have to
develop a relationship that is mutually acceptable. If the acquiring
ﬁrm does not develop a psychological contract through mutual
goal development, or formulation of agreeable norms acceptable to
the KMT, then the KMT is apt to leave.
H2. There is a positive relationship between the development of
the psychological contract and KMT retention after the acquisition
of the target ﬁrm.
2.2. Market turbulence during global acquisitions
The ability to develop a psychological contract with the KMT
will also be affected by the characteristics of the market
environment. In particular, the managers preexisting inter-
organizational relationships will inﬂuence relational interaction
and contact development. Market turbulence varies in intensity
and the ability and necessity to develop psychological contracts
will vary as well. The type of market affects how an organization’s
human resources are organized, employed and subsequently
integrated by the KMT managers (Barney, 1986, 1988; Dierickx
& Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984). Additionally, the market type also
affects the embedded knowledge base of the ﬁrm. Knowledge often
becomes the most strategically signiﬁcant resource of the
organization because it allows for the development of dynamic
capabilities as the environment becomes increasingly turbulent
(Grant, 1996; Quinn, 1992).
From an organizational theory perspective, market turbulence
(also called market uncertainty, environmental uncertainty,
industry turbulence, and industry dynamics) signiﬁcantly impacts
organizational structure and performance (Lu & Yang, 2004). For
example, cross-functional cooperation (Grifﬁn & Hauser, 1996),
and research and development and marketing personnel need to
strengthen cooperative ties for competitive advantage in highly
competitive environments. Market turbulence relates to the rate of
unpredictable change in a ﬁrm’s environment and its effect is to
hinder the ability of managers to predict future events affecting the
ﬁrm (Child, 1972). High levels of market turbulence place great
demands upon the KMT as routine solutions are not acceptable
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Therefore, in ﬁrms in industries
characterized by high levels of market turbulence, KMTs will need
to be proactive in the exploration of new niches and resources
(Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). Successful ﬁrms in these industry
environments tend to have KMTs that make decisions character-
ized by speed and comprehensiveness (Eisenhardt, 1989). As
demands are constantly shifting, opportunities for these managers
will become abundant and performance should be better in these
ﬁrms with such a ﬁt between orientation and industry environ-
ment (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005).
Market turbulence plays a role in acquisitions because it
impacts the optimal level of integration of supply-chain members.
Under- or over-integration can result in failure to create value, or
result in value destruction such as the loss of key relationships in
the value-chain (Pablo, 1994). The environment of a market will
inﬂuence the organizational and strategic routines, by which ﬁrms
achieve new resource reconﬁgurations (relationships) as markets
emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
Also, organizations have time-based interdependencies between
their resources and the inter-organizational environment which
Fig. 1. Model of supply-chain corporate venturing through acquisition: key
management team retention.
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supply-chain.
Because change is a critical component of the highly turbulent
market, organizational knowledge embedded within the KMT
takes on increased importance because this knowledge forms the
basis for absorptive capacity and dynamic capabilities (Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1997; Ireland & Hitt, 1999) (see Fig. 1). Accordingly, we
argue that psychological contract development is essential in
intense markets. Mutual understanding over roles, handling of
unexpected events, and management of the target ﬁrm after
acquisition in such a dynamic environment will rely upon
psychological contract development.
H3. There is a positive relationship between market turbulence
and need for psychological contract development particularly
when inter-organizational relations are central to the value of
the acquisition.
2.3. Methodology
2.3.1. Data collection
Several elements must be considered before conducting
empirical tests on the proposed relationships in our model: the
model itself does not lend itself to a study using secondary data,
therefore developing/pre-testing the items and questionnaire,
identiﬁcation of sample, response bias, common method variance
and scale development all need to be reviewed. Due to the highly
perceptual nature of data related to target ﬁrm post-acquisition
performance and also in regard to the psychological contract
development, a survey method of collecting data is most
appropriate. For most ﬁrms, acquisition of ﬁnancial performance
information is usually consolidated if reported publicly, so speciﬁc
acquisition performance data would not be available. Further, the
majority of the acquisitions under examination are quite small. To
ascertain post-acquisition performance of the acquired ﬁrm,
perceptual data were required. Insider informants have been used
extensively in strategy research (e.g., Frederickson, 1984).
We initially prepared a draft questionnaire with items to test
the variables. We obtained input on these preliminary items from
an expert panel of M&A professionals from different industries, as
well as from respected academics. The expert panel was composed
of ﬁve academics terminally qualiﬁed with a focus in M&A
research, one partner from Ernst and Young, one Senior Vice
President from GE in charge of their M&A department, one senior
executive for the US in charge of logistics for a $10 billion ﬁrm, and
1 CFO of Europe in charge of M&A.
A pilot study was performed with a small sample of business
professionals that have participated in acquisitions. Fifteen people
reviewed the preliminary items. Three were from Price-Water-
house/Coopers, three were international mergers and acquisitions
managers, six were top managers, and three were academics. We
administered the pilot version of the questionnaire to these M&Aprofessionals. After the pilot was administered, we analyzed the
data. During this pilot study we had asked the participants to make
suggestions in regard to confusing questions, or any comments in
general. We made changes in the instrument where we deemed
necessary based on this feedback. We administered the pilot
version of the questionnaire to these M&A professionals. The pilot
data were not included in the ﬁnal analysis. Although not included
in these research ﬁndings, we noted that a large percentage of the
acquisitions had pre-acquisition performance higher in compari-
son to referent others in their industry. This is in line with the pilot
study participants’ suggestions, the expert panel advice, and the
resource based view, as ﬁrms in a value chain would acquire ﬁrms
with rare, inimitable and valuable assets which would suggest they
are performing well in general.
2.3.2. Sample
The individuals we surveyed came from an Ernst and Young Inc.
database of top executives who have bought supply-chain ﬁrms
within the past year. The database contained 807 names. Examples
of the titles of the individuals that were sent the surveys were Vice
Presidents (110), Senior VPs (23), CEOs (24), CFOs (25), and
Directors (49). These are senior managers who have been directly
involved in a recent acquisition and are aware of the post-
acquisition performance of the acquired ﬁrm. After eliminating
those that were either no longer at that address, ‘‘return to sender’’,
or their ofﬁce notiﬁed us they were no longer with the ﬁrm, or
deceased, we had 610 possible respondents. We received a sample
of 102 responses although only 99 were complete for a response
rate of 17%. Of the responses, answers to the questions ‘‘Was the
acquisition an important supplier?’’ and ‘‘Was the acquisition an
important customer?’’ lead to approximately 92 of the acquisitions
either directly being a ‘‘current’’ suppliers (45) or customers (47).
The response rate for surveys of senior management is typically
very low, so we were pleased with the number of responses
obtained as it is consistent with similar surveys (cf., Hambrick,
Geletkancyz, & Fredrickson, 1993; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochrane
1999). Industries represented in the data were from 72 different
areas (see Table 5). The recipients of the survey were executives
who were involved with acquisitions globally, although their
mailing addresses, home and ofﬁce, were within the US. As the US
has nearly 30% of the largest global companies (per Forbes Fortune
500), much of the international acquisition activity occurs through
US ﬁrms buying overseas.
3. Measures (see Appendix A for details of items used)
3.1. Dependent variable
Performance: scholars typically use a variety of measures to
measure the multidimensional construct of performance (Edel-
man, Brush, & Manolova, 2005). We focused on three key areas of
acquisition performance: ﬁnancial performance (four items), goal
attainment (four items), and employee performance (two items).
These three measures represent ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial
outcomes. A comparative method is more effective in eliciting
responses than asking respondents directly to provide exact
numbers for acquisition performance (Lau & Ngo, 2001; Tomas-
kovic-Devey, Leiter, & Thompson, 1994). We asked respondents to
respond to perceived performance using a 7-point Likert scale
(higher scores representing higher performance) on each of the
three areas using ten items to obtain a scaled performance metric.
The scale was developed by utilizing pre-existing measures
developed by Lau and Ngo (2001) and Cannella and Hambrick
(1993) and adapting them through suggestions from our expert
panel plus through pre-testing. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 10
items was a = 0.94.
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Psychological contract: measures the extent to which the
psychological contract of the relationship was transferred or
developed. For psychological contract measurement, we adapted a
pre-existing scale (Lusch & Brown, 1996) with ﬁve separate items.
The measures focused on psychological contracting over roles and
psychological contracting over the handling of unexpected events
as well as the mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities.
We used a 7-point Likert scale to measure these areas of the
psychological contract and obtained an overall Cronbach’s alpha of
a = 0.86 for the ﬁve items.
KMT retention: is measured with four items and identiﬁes the
proportion of executives that were retained. Similar to Cannella
and Hambrick (1993), the perceived volume of valuable executives
retained as well as whether the acquired KMT remained intact. As
suggested by pre-testing responses and from the expert panel,
reviewing the sheer number of executives retained for small to
medium sized ﬁrms does not provide a full picture. Although we
argue that the KMT is valuable it is also true that there are those
individuals in smaller ﬁrms who may be (for example) relatives
with an executive title (or similar situations), but of no value.
Therefore we explore both, the number of executives retained, and
whether the valuable executives were retained. Again, we used a 7-
point Likert scale to measure retention and obtained an overall
Cronbach’s alpha of a = 0.967 on the four items.
Market turbulence environmental: instability plays an important
role in inﬂuencing decision effectiveness (Dean & Sharfman, 1996).
Most researchers agree that the concept of industry competitive
dynamics is composed of multiple dimensions. We asked the
managers to identify the industry they are in (e.g., Biotech, high-
tech, and transportation) (Table 1). Market turbulence was
measured through two measures: muniﬁcence and dynamism
similar to previous research (Ensley, Pearce, & Hmieleski, 2006, see
also Keats & Hitt, 1988). Muniﬁcence is the capability or the ability
of the environment to sustain growth. Dynamism is the stability or
instability and the rate or degree of environmental change (Dess &
Beard, 1984). Muniﬁcence was calculated using a ﬁve-year growth
in net sales for each industry (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002).
Using annual ﬁgures across all ﬁrms in each relevant industry,
the natural logarithms were utilized in a time series approach
from Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys (11-13-2003). Time
served as the independent variable. The growth measure of each
was the antilog of the regression slope coefﬁcient. The result is a
smoothed measure of the average growth rate over the period.
Instability reﬂected ﬁve year patterns of instability in the
dominant industry. The measures were antilogs of the standard
error of each regression slope coefﬁcient from the growth
equations described in the muniﬁcence measure. Thus to be
consistent with the arguments of Dess and Beard (1984) and
Tosi, Aldag, and Storey (1973) the indicators capture true
discontinuities in the task environment and allow similar scores
for task environments that present similar patterns but at
different base levels of magnitude.
Control variables: size differences between acquiring and
acquired ﬁrms may inﬂuence acquisition performance (Kusewitt,
1995). We included this as a control in our analyses. Increases in
organizational size add complexity with its attendant increases in
structural elaboration and formalized systems for planning,
control, and resource allocation (Quinn & Cameron, 1983).
Increases in organizational size can create progressively stronger
resistance to fundamental change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).
Some researchers suggest that the smaller an acquired ﬁrm is
relative to an acquiring ﬁrm, the greater an acquired executive’s
propensity to depart (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). Consistent with
previous work in the acquisition literature, we calculated size bydividing the sales of the acquired ﬁrm before acquisition by the
sales of the acquiring ﬁrm (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993).
Our second control variable was the method by which the ﬁrm
was purchased. From the acquirer’s perspective, they can use their
cash holdings, increase their debt by borrowing, and sell more
equity through shares of stock, or a combination of these. As our
research focus is on the target ﬁrm’s KMT including their retention
and value to post-acquisition performance, we are concerned with
the form of payment for the acquisition because a cash purchase
may unduly enrich the target ﬁrm KMT (assuming they are stock
holders) who may then wish to exit. Therefore we controlled for
either receipt of cash (‘‘1’’) or other (‘‘2’’).
We also controlled for the ownership structure of the target
ﬁrm (i.e., privately owned, publicly owned with dispersed stock-
holders, or publicly owned with few majority stockholders).
Privately owned ﬁrms will typically be managed by an owner who
is also a member of the KMT. Purchasing a privately owned ﬁrm
may or may not suggest that the owner is either retiring or going to
pursue other interests. Consistent with the RBV, the owner may
only be seeking resources from the acquiring ﬁrm in which to
continue and be more successful. A publicly owned ﬁrm with
diverse investors will be managed by a KMT of experts. We
controlled for whether the acquired ﬁrm was a privately owned
(‘‘1’’) or other (‘‘2’’).
Managers that are familiar with mergers and acquisitions are
typically KMT who may not readily respond to surveys. We used
extrapolation methods to examine non-response bias. Extrapola-
tion methods are based on the assumption that subjects who
respond less readily (late responders) are more like non-
respondents than are early responders. The most common type
of extrapolation is carried over successive waves of a questionnaire
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Wave analysis employing MANOVA
was used to check for non-response bias examining selected scale
items from each construct (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Each of
the major survey waves was counted as a separate wave, for a total
of three waves. Wave analysis, in the form of MANOVA, was
performed covering all relevant variables and found no signiﬁcant
differences between each wave that would indicate the possibility
of non-response bias.
Key informant methodology has some signiﬁcant drawbacks in
the forms of informant bias and random error. Since our sample used
key informants that occupied roles that make them knowledgeable
about the issues being researched and were able and willing to
communicate with the ﬁrst author, we aver that key informant bias
is not a major consideration. Retrospective reports in regard to
perceptions have been researched (Golden, 1992; Huber & Power,
1985) utilizing executive’s retrospective accounts to identify ﬁrm
strategy (Boeker, 1989), planning processes (Eisenhardt & Bour-
geois, 1988) and strategic and organizational change (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1990). Other research suggests sole informants at
high levels such as CEO may actually increase the validity, or
conﬁdence in their report (Sharfman, 1998). More recent research
suggests that retrospective reports are accurate and an effective
technique for management research (Golden, 1992).
3.3. Analysis
To assess multivariate and univariate normality analyses of
skewness, kurtosis, and outliers were performed using Q–Q (P–P)
plots and standard tests for each indicator. Reviews of the skewness
and kurtosis statistics suggest that no transformations were
required as all the skewness and kurtosis numbers fall below 1.96
which corresponds to a 0.05 error level (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, &
Black, 1998). We utilized Harman’s one factor test to assess the
degree of common method variance due to the fact that the data all
came from the same survey. The results of this procedure suggest
Table 1
Means, standard deviation and correlation among all variables.
Mean Standard
deviation
1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Performance 4.66 1.43
(2) Retention 4.40 1.96 0.40
(3) Psychological contract 4.85 1.23 0.45 0.55
(4) Environmental turbulence 2.06 0.78 0.06 0.12 0.19
(5) Size 0.31 0.92 0.17 0.07 0.15 0.10
(6) Ownershipa 1.60 0.49 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.27 0.10
(7) How purchaseda 1.49 0.50 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.20 0.12
Correlation > 0.36 signiﬁcant at p < .01, correlation > 0.20 signiﬁcant at p < .05.
a Spearman rank correlation with ordinal data.
T. Kiessling et al. / Journal of World Business 47 (2012) 81–92 87that a single factor did not emerge nor one general factor account for
the majority of variance (e.g., Greene & Organ, 1973).
For construct validity, we performed exploratory factor analysis
to see if a unidimensional solution came out of the exploratory
analysis. For each of our independent and dependent variables we
found that each construct’s items were all signiﬁcantly correlated
(p < .001) in accordance with the Bartlett test of sphericity,
Cronbach’s alpha and the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy (MSA) suggested high intercorrelation among
the related variables of each construct.
3.4. Results
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and correla-
tions for our variables. Table 2 presents the results of the testing of
the hypotheses (Tables 3 and 4).
To examine the hypotheses, we used hierarchal linear regression
with controls entered ﬁrst followed by the independent variable.
Hypothesis 1 examined the relationship between retention andTable 2
The impact of retention of the KMT on performance.
Dependent variable
Performance Controls Retention
Size of acquisition 0.16 (1.61) 0.19* (2.07)
Cash used in purchase 0.06 (0.57) 0.03 (0.32)
Privately owned
prior to acquisition
0.08 (0.76) 0.09 (0.94)
Retention of KMT 0.42** (4.59)
R2 0.035 208
F-statistic 1.20 6.35
R2 0.035 0.137
F-statistic for change 1.20 21.09**
N = 99. Standardized coefﬁcients reported. T-Statistics reported in parentheses.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
Table 3
The impact of psychological contract development on KMT retention.
Dependent variable
KMT retention
Controls Psychological
contract development
Size of acquisition 0.07 (0.68) 0.15 (1.80)
Cash used in purchase 0.07 (0.66) 0.07 (0.81)
Privately owned prior to acquisition 0.02 (0.22) 0.01 (0.15)
Psychological
contract development
0.57** (6.75)
R2 0.011 0.331
F-statistic 0.342 11.77
R2 0.011 0.321
F-statistic for change 0.342 45.58**
N = 99. Standardized coefﬁcients reported. T-Statistics reported in parentheses.
** p < .01.post-acquisition performance. The coefﬁcient for this variable was
positive and signiﬁcant (p < .001). Accordingly, we ﬁnd that post-
acquisition retention of the KMT is positively associated with
performance in the business unit. Therefore, H1 is supported.
We wanted to test whether the KMT is a valuable resource from
a RBV perspective and whether their retention facilitated greater
performance post-acquisition. Contrarily, the market for corporate
control suggests that the ﬁrm was bought because it was
underperforming and brought in new management, thus not
retaining the KMT. These two theoretical frameworks are not
contradictory. During the development of the market for corporate
control literature, the time frame was during the years of
conglomerate building, staid industries with secondary samples
from the US, while our research explores the global dynamic
environment where the majority of ﬁrms are acquiring to compete
globally and are not seeking underperforming ﬁrms, but successful
ones that when combined create even greater success. These
observations are in agreement with current research and those
opinions of our expert panel.
Hypothesis 2 examined the relationship between psychological
contract development and retention. The coefﬁcient for psycho-
logical contract development was positive and signiﬁcant
(p < .001) thereby supporting hypothesis 2. When the acquiring
organization puts greater effort into developing the psychological
contract between the KMT of the acquired unit and the
corporation, a greater portion of the KMT stays after the
acquisition. This has implications for at the very least due
diligence, hostile acquisitions and acquisition negotiations. During
the due diligence, the acquiring ﬁrm should begin the psychologi-
cal contract development and not just make this a data collection
effort by outside agencies and accountants and continue through
to negotiations and post-acquisition monitoring. If the KMT is a
valuable asset, hostile takeovers will not have the impetus for
psychological contract development, thus loss of the KMT.
Hypothesis 3 examined how environmental dynamism affected
the development of the psychological contract. We believed that
greater dynamism would prompt the acquiring organization to putTable 4
The impact of environmental turbulence on psychological contract development.
Dependent variable
Psychological
contract development
Controls Environmental
turbulence
Size of acquisition 0.15 (1.46) 0.123 (1.23)
Cash used in purchase 0.00 (0.02) 0.021 (0.21)
Privately owned prior to acquisition 0.02 (0.17) 0.036 (0.347)
Environmental turbulence 0.222 (2.16)
R2 0.022 0.067
F-statistic 0.706 1.71
R2 0.022 0.046
F-statistic for change 0.71 4.66*
N = 99. Standardized coefﬁcients reported. T-Statistics reported in parentheses.
* p < .05.
Table 5
List of industry types reported by respondents.
Apparel 1 Energy 1 Logistics 1
Automotive 2 Energy Holding Co. 1 Manufacturing 6
B2B e-commerce software 1 Engineering services 2 Marketing services 1
Bakery manufacturer 1 Federal consulting 1 Mechanical contractor 1
Banking 1 Fiber optics 1 Medical software 1
Billing software 1 Financial 1 Military contracting 1
Biopharmaceutical 2 Financial investments 1 Mortgage banker 1
Biotech 2 Financial services 3 Mortgage banking 1
Broadcasting 1 Funeral 2 Ofﬁce equipment distribution 1
Business consulting 1 Gas and oil 1 Online marketplace 1
Business services 1 Government contracting 1 Outsourcing services 1
Chemical 1 Government contracting – IT 1 Professional services 1
Chemical production 1 Government IT services 1 Retail 3
Collection 1 Healthcare 2 Savings and loan 1
Commercial Bank 1 Healthcare products 1 Security services 1
Communications and technology 1 High Tech 1 Software 3
Communications solutions 1 Industrial instruments 1 Storage software 1
Computer sales 1 Information technology 3 Technology-based business solutions 1
Computer software 1 Insurance 1 Telecom 7
Computing products 1 Internet 1 Telecom consulting 1
Construction 4 Internet billing 1 Title insurance 1
Defense 2 IT services 2 Transportation 2
Direct broadcast satellite 1 Lawn and garden products 1 Voice and data communications 1
dmv checks 1 Legal outsourcing 1
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ensure greater retention of the KMT. We argued that environmen-
tal dynamism is associated with increased competition – and fast
competitors. Signiﬁcant KMT turnover would prove deleterious
because it would slow the reaction of the business unit to
competitive pressures. Thus, we hypothesized a positive relation-
ship between environmental dynamism and psychological con-
tract development. The coefﬁcient for the industry dynamic
variable is signiﬁcant (p < .05) in support of Hypothesis 3.
In the global marketplace where the supply chain and
management of the supply chain are now considered important
to be competitive, ﬁrms are integrating forward and backward to
create complementary strengths. Although outsourcing, off
shoring, etc. are occurring, many ﬁrms are still acquiring to
strengthen and leverage their competencies globally. Thus the
dynamic global environment in which all ﬁrms are competing will
require the development of the psychological contract, especially
in the hypercompetitive industries where products, services,
customer needs are constantly changing and the supply manage-
ment becomes even more critical (Table 1).
4. Discussion and conclusion
Acquisitions continue to be an important activity in the 21st
century. Although they may serve an important function within a
corporate venturing context, the ability to derive value from these
acquisitions is often dependent on retaining the human capital of the
key supply-chain management team. However, scholars are begin-
ning to recognize the difﬁculty of realizing value when it is
embedded in human assets (Coff, 1997). These actors are not
constrained by organizational boundaries and care must be taken to
gain their conﬁdence and support after their organization is acquired.
Our analysis reveals that development of the psychological contract
in terms of establishing mutual understanding concerning expected
roles and responsibilities as well as expectations concerning roles
and responsibilities for dealing with unexpected events facing the
organization aids in retention after the acquisition. This seems rather
intuitive but is important for extending our understanding of
acquisition performance from a resource based view.
Whereas most research examining post-acquisition perform-
ance has focused on corporate parent performance, we have
focused on the perceived performance of the acquired organiza-
tion. We have done this since our focus has been on the keymanagement team of the acquired unit. Although perceptual
measures suffer from limitations, the ability to obtain objective
veriﬁable performance data is virtually impossible. In our study we
found that greater retention is associated with superior perform-
ance within the business after acquisition. This too is rather
intuitive especially since the majority of the acquisitions under
consideration are much smaller than the mega-deals discussed in
the public arena. Indeed, we ﬁnd that larger relative acquisitions in
our sample perform worse overall when retention is entered into
the regression equation which would indicate potential problems
with integrative efforts. We ﬁnd that the relative size of the
acquisition is also negatively related to the development of the
psychological contract in support of this view.
Importantly, we ﬁnd that market turbulence is positively
related to the development of the psychological contract as
hypothesized. Again, we believe that this is rather intuitive since
environmental dynamism enhances the value of the key personnel
inter-organization knowledge base and relationships. If this
knowledge and personal contacts are resident in the human assets
(e.g., key inter-organizational managers), then it makes sense that
the acquiring organization would seek to establish the psychologi-
cal contract as soon as possible as a means to retain the key
management team with the inter-organizational contacts (Ander-
son & Narus, 1996; Hunt & Morgan, 1994; Palmatier et al., 2006).
We believe that an excellent opportunity exists to examine how
the psychological contract affects spun-off units. Although spin-
offs typically aid the corporation casting-off the business
(Markides, 1992), the performance of the organizations spun-off
is less clear (Daley, Mehrotra, & Sviakuma, 1997). Indeed, Woo,
Willard, and Daellenbach (1992) ﬁnd no improved performance
among spin-offs in terms of ROA, market to book, or sales growth.
We suspect that in many cases the psychological contract may
have already been violated for those spun off units particularly if
the corporate parent has experienced performance problems
before the spinoff. Examining retention after spinoffs is thus an
interesting area of focus and may allow for the collection of
veriﬁable performance data although perceptual data would still
be needed to measure psychological contract perceptions.
The theoretical contribution of this research has implications for
both the resource based view and the literature on psychological
contracts. The dominant theoretical foundation for acquisitions was
either agency theory where top managers were purchasing other
ﬁrms as a portfolio to hedge their risk, or the market for corporate
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purchase replacing the KMT with their own managers. Both of these
theories do continue to have explanatory power, but RBV is now
becoming validated through research and the rare, valuable and
inimitable assets in the ‘‘black box’’ of a ﬁrm are being explored. In a
global supply chain where a successful ﬁrm is purchased for their
competencies, the KMT will need to be retained to assist in
leveraging of competencies. As the resource based view focuses on
assets that are inimitable, acquisition may be the only alternative
and the success in retaining the KMT will be a key factor.
This research also extends the psychological contract literature
building on both the normative contracting literature in regard to
supply chain relationships and psychological contracts. We have
combined both streams of literature to explain the successful
retention of the KMT after acquisition. The importance of retaining
the KMT through the development of psychological contracts is
apparent as post-acquisition performance is greater when reten-
tion of the KMT occurs.
4.1. Managerial relevance
This research has many lessons for practitioners in regard to the
global supply chain KMT, acquisitions, and the process ofAppendix Aacquiring. Although many ﬁrms continue to outsource, many
other ﬁrms are still involved in acquiring ﬁrms within their global
supply chain to leverage competencies and acquire new ones that
may be country speciﬁc, product speciﬁc, necessary for control
purposes, etc. Our research suggests that due to the KMT’s role
based on obtaining and coordinating resources, developing and
implementing strategy, and the development of internal and
external knowledge and networks, the KMT should be retained.
This viewpoint is from the resource based view that the reason for
the acquisition is to acquire rare, valuable and inimitable
resources.
Past research suggests that often top managers leave the ﬁrm
after acquisition because the psychological contract that was
developed before acquisition between the KMT and ﬁrm is not
transferable to the acquiring ﬁrm. There are several major
implications to practitioners from our research. The KMT may
not be motivated to remain after acquisition only by new
monetary contracts but by the relationship development that is
necessary for a psychological contract to be effective, which
becomes more daunting depending upon the global nature of the
supply chain and the local culture. As such, the development of the
psychological contract should be initiated early in the acquisition
process.
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